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The current Defense Acquisition Improvement Program
(DAI?) has focused renewed attention or. many of the
perceived management problems in the federal acquisition
process. Included among these are ths motivation of the
contractors and the methods used to Lncentivize contract
performance. This study examines the complex array of
factors which motivate Department of the Navy (DoN) major
weapon system contractors, contrasting these factors with
current DoN incentive contracting practices.
The authors found that there are many contractual and
extra-contractual factors other than profit which motivate
contractor behavior; that current incentive contracting
methods are generally perceived to be effective; and that
the best way to improve the motivation of the contractor is
to reduce the impact of the forces which tend to inhibit
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The Defense Acquisition Improvement Program (DAIP) ,
inititiated by Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci in
early 1980, has once again focused the attention of nearly
everyone who is a player la the federal acquisition process
on the many perceived management problems contained therein
[Ref. 1]. Although improving the motivation of Department
of Defense (DOD) contractors is not specifically stated as
one of the primary purposes of the program, at least twelve
of the thirty-two initiatives were designed to do just that.
In a study completed in early 1981, by the Army Procurement
Research Office, program instability, inappropriate contract
type, and excess socio-economic regulations were identified
as major disince rtives by Defense contractors, and all three
of these are direct subjects of individual initiatives
[Ref- 2]. Additionally, many of the initiatives are
directly concerned with the methods of incentivizing DOD
contracts for the purpose of improving contractor motivation
(e.g. the word "incentives" appears in the title of several
of them) . While this study is not directly concerned with
tha DAIP, it does focus in some considerable detail on the
motivation and incentivizat ion of major Defense contractor
organizations, and hopefully will provide some insight into
the potential effectiveness of the program in this area.
Over the years many theories have been developed about
how to motivate groups and organizations through the appli-
cation of goals and objectives. Froa the "Scientific
Management" approach of Frederick W. Taylor through "manage-
ment by Objectives" originated by Peter Drucker, and the

concept of strategic planning currently in vogue, many
organizational behaviorists have attempted to identify the
ideal method of managing an organization. A common thread
in all of these nanagement systems is the starting point:
defining the goals and/or objectives of the organization, or
planning. In the words of one writer,
.Organi zational
,
planning has, primacy over the
c<
...Planning focuses the attention Df our organization on
its goals." [ Bef . 3]
It would naturally follow that the best way to motivate
an organization would be to help it achieve these goals or
objectives. Toward this and, the Government has developed
and implemented many different incentives designed to better
motivate its contractors. All of the recent press state-
ments concerning the lack of productivity within U.S.
industry, and the shrinking of the industrial base, would
seem to indicate that something is not working. The purpose
of this research is to attempt to identify the factors which
serve to motivate Department of the Navy (DcN) major
contractors, and compare these factors with the incentives
currently being utilized by DcN contracting offices. The
thesis will also compare the opinions of the two parties as
to the relative priority of the goals and objectives of the
Government. We also hope to both validate the major conclu-
sions of some recent studies, and to suggest some changes in




Given the preceding general objectives, the following
primary research guestion was posed: What are the major
factors which motivate Department of the Navy contractors,
and what is their relative priority?
The following ancillary research questions were deemed
pertinent in addressing tha basic research guest. ion:
1. What is the perceived relative priority of Government
contracting objectives?
2. How does DON currently incentivize its contractors?
3. what is the perceived effectiveness of DON
contracting incentives?
4. Hew can DCN better motivate its suppliers through the
contracting process?
C. SCOPE r LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
1 . Scop_e
After reviewing available literature on the subject
of contractor motivation, particularly recent govemment-
sponsored research reports, the authors concluded that the
scope should be limited to Department of the Navy major
weapons system acquisitions. The decision to concentrate on
DoN was based on the fact that all of the prior studies had
concentrated almost exclusively on the Departments of the
Army and Air Force. One of our subordinate goals was,
therefore, to compare results among the services and draw
conclusions about the Department of Defense (DOD) as a
whole. The concentration on major weapons system contrac-
tors was a deliberate decision based on the authors* firm
belief that federal acquisition policy is driven by, and
designed to support, the interrelationships of the govern-
ment and its major suppliers. Although major systems buys
represent a small portion of the total procurement actions
within DCD, they do constitute the majority of the dollars
10

spent each year [Ref. 4], Policy changes, therefore, are
designed primarily to improve the major weapons system
acquisition process. Recent examples include 0M3 Circular
A-1 09 and the current Defense Acquisition Improvement
Program discussed previously. This belief may be more
appropriately characterized by some as an assumption, but
either classification will suffice provided the reader is
aware of its implications.
2 • Limitations
The major limitation was the size of the survey
samples. For a variety of reasons which could best be
summed up to expediency, the authors intentionally limited
the size of the samples to between 33 and 50 respondents
from each. of the two populations, DON Contracting Officers
and their counterparts in industry. Because of the Cen-.ral
Limit Theorem, however, we felt that the statistical anal-
ysis of the data would not be biased nor invalidated by wha 4
might be considered an inadequate sample size (see Chapter
IV, Section A).
Another self-imposed limitation was the length of
the survey. Because of rime and money constraints, the
authors decided to conduct the survey by telephone and limi J
the length of any one call to between ten and fifteen
minutes. This decision restricted the number of questions
which could be asked, and in some respects helped determine
the format of the questions. We do feel, however, that the
data obtained is sufficient to support our conclusions and
recommendations and answer the basic research questions.
3 • Assumptions
In addition to our assumptions regarding major
weapon systems vis-a-vis federal acquisition policy and the
Central Limit Theorem discussed above, this study assumes
11

that the reader commands a general knowledge or basic famil-
iarity with DOD contracting language and the Defense acqui-
sition process.
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research methodology utilized in this study
consisted of two basic components: (1) development of a
literature base, and (2) a survey of DON major systems
program personnel and their counterparts in industry. The
literature base was compilad mainly through the Defense
Logistics Studies Information Exchange, the Naval
Postgraduate School library and a review of various journal;
and periodicals which concern themseLves with the federal
acguisition process. The data collected from the question-
naires is presented in Chapter IV and the questionnaires
themselves are ir.cluded as Appendix A.
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT
The report a-tempts to take the reader through the
subject at hand in the mcst logical nanner possible.
Chapter II presents some basic background information on
motivational theory, contractor objectives, government
objectives, and a brief discussion on the Defense acquisi-
tion environment. Chapter III is a curren- perspective of
DOD incentive contracting, particularly as it is presented
in the DOD and NASA Incentive Contracting Guide. Pertinent
excerpts are presented in Appendix 3. This will provide a
background from which one can more easily review the anal-
ysis of the survey data as it is discussed in Chapter IV.





A. MOTIVATION OP ORGANIZATIONS
Motivation is defined as that which causes, channels,
and sustains an organization's behavior [Ref. 5].
In an effort to better understand the factors that
influence DON contractor motivation, the authors first
studied several motivational theories. Organizational moti-
vation was intensively studied by Elton Mayo during the
period 1927-1932 at the Hawthorne Works (Chicago) of the
Western Electric Company. Since thai, many different behav-
ioral theories on motivation have bean developed. Three of
the most widely accepted are presented below.
Perhaps the most renowned motivational theorist was A.
H. Masiow. He studied the needs of the individual and
conciudsd that man attempts to satisfy needs in the
following order:
1. Physical needs (food and water)
2. Safety needs (shelter, physical protection)
3. Social needs (need to belong)
4. Egotistical needs (need to obtain respect)
5. Self actualization (the desire to become everything
that one is capabi= of becoming) [Ref. 6]
Fredrick Herzberg's sat isfier/dissatisf ier theory on
motivation claims that factors affecting worker performance
can be divided into two groups. Satisfier factors are thos*
which promote feelings of job satisfaction and include such-
things as recognition, achievement, responsibility, and the
possibility of growth and advancement. The dissatisf iers
are those factors that do net by themselves promote job
satisfaction, but if not present, can lead to job dissatis-
faction. Examples include pay, early retirement, job
security and satisfactory home life. [Ref. 7]
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Victor Vroom, another noted behavioralist , stated that
the strength of a person's desire or aversion for "some-
thing" is founded net on its intrinsic properties, but on
the anticipated satisfaction or dissatisfaction associated
with other outcomes to which they ar= expected to lead.
[Ref. 8]
These, and other motivational theories studied, explain
behavior in terms of either seeking the satisfaction of
goals, objectives and neels, or through the avoidance of
undesirable outcomes. The next section looks at contractor
objectives, a necessary sta p in an effort to determine what
are the factors which motivate them.
B. CONTRACTOR OEJECTIVES
Contractor objectives can be divided into contractual
objectives and long-term corporate goals. These two catego-
ries are related in that the collective objectives of
performing all -G ever nment contracts must reflect the overall
long-term corporate strategy. Previous research has shown
that firms have indeed mor = objectives than just profit
[Ref- 2]. On any one contract, a contractor could have a
number cf different objectives. This study will identify
these contractual objectives and try to determine what can
be dene to satisfy them in an effort to obtain better
overall contract performance.
Just how strong is the profit objective? R. N. Anthony
points out that iranagers strive for satisfactory profit
rather than maxiirum profit. He states that in addition to
being very difficult to achieve, strict profi 4- maximization,
if practiced, would be unethical and immoral. For example,
profit maximization might encourage the contractor to take
every possible cost-saving shortcut lot expressly prohibited
under the contract. [Ref. 9]
n

Aside from profit, what are the primary contractual
objectives of the government contractor? Company growth,
provide a good product, market share, develop new skills,
guarantee of follow-on work, risk aversion, "mastery" (a
desire to control one's own destiny}, safeguard proprietary
interests, flexibility to customer, utilize excess capacity,
and improve cash flow have all been cited as prime business
objectives [Ref- 2]-
There are basically three research methods of deter-
mining the contractual objectives of a contractor for a
specific contract. First, a post-performance review of
contractual outcomes and associated benefits to the
contractor can be conducted. However, this only identifies
those objectives that were attained. Often, contractual
objectives are net fulfilled and occasionally additional
benefits accrue to the contractor which could be miscon-
strued as pre-perfor mance contractual objectives. Second, a
list of possible contractual objectives car. be provided to
the contractor. He can then be requested to rate the rela-
tive importance of each objective as it pertained to
performance on recent contracts. This method is more likely
to accurately reflect contractor objectives than the first
research method mentioned, but the authors felt that
providing a "shopping list" of contract objectives would
tend to bias the response. After all, the intent of the
research is to determine what the contractor's predetermined
conscious objectives in seeking and performing the contract
were, not which objectives from the list provided reflect
corporate goals cr happened to be fulfilled through contract
performance. The third possible research method of
identifying contractual objectives removes this "shopping
list" bias, and was the method utilized in this study. The
authors simply asked the contractor to list the top three
objectives that the firm hoped to attain by performing the
15

contract. In addition to the actual responses, the authors
felt that the ability or Liability of the contractors to
quickly provide the top three contractual objectives would
be a reflection of the following:
1. How conscious are the contractors of specific
contractual objectives as opposed to long-term corpo-
rate goals?
2. Hew actively are the contractors pursuing attainment
of these contractual objectives?
3. How important are the objectives?
4. At what levels within the contractor organization are
these goals made clear?
As previously mentioned, once contractor objectives have
bean identified, contractor performance can be enhanced if
the Government helps in the fulfillment of these objectives.
The following section discusses the Government's contractual
objectives, the DOD contracting environment, and their
impact on the contractor's ability to attain his objectives.
C. GOVERNMENT OBJECTIVES
The Government, like the contractor, has many varied
objectives on any given contract. These objectives may be
classified as either contractual objectives or extra-
contractual objectives. The following are the three primary
Government contractual objectives:
1. Obtaining the exact item or service called for in the
specifications of the contract.
2. Obtaining it at a fair and reasonable price.
3. Ensuring cn-time delivery.
Extra-contractual objectives pertain primarily to those
socio-economic programs which ire implemented through ^he
contracting process. For example, small and disadvantaged
business provisions, labor surplus set-asides, employment of
the handicapped, and preference for domestic material (Buy




The Government should want, to enhance contract perform-
ance by helping the contractors meet their objectives.
However, as the APRO report points out, there are factors
which affect Government contractual behavior other than the
rational desire to motivate contractors. This report states
that the Government is under substantial legal and formal
constraints. Consequently, Government offices have little
autonomy in conducting operations, tand to proliferate
formal procedures and controls, and are vulnerable to many
external sources of diverse influences. Another factor
which makes the defense contracting environment unique is
that the Government policy and procedures can be susceptible
to the demands of a number of informal influences (e.g.
lobbyists) and contractors may build advocacy for their
mission through various constituencies and authorities (e.g.
congressmen). [ Bef . 2]
Several examples of statutory and regulatory constraints
were identified by the APRO report. The fact that formal
advertising is the preferred method of procurement
[Ref. 10], limits the contracting officer's award flexi-
bility since the contract must go to the lowest responsible,
responsive bidder, without examination of other factors.
This limited flexibility in source selection also tends to
limit the use of certain incentives. The amount of profit
payable to contractors on negotiated procurements is limited
by the formal weighted guidelines profit determination
method [Ref. 11]. The Government is restricted in its
ability to structure payment provisions. Limits have been
placed on advanced payments, progress payments, and multi-
year contracting, all of which are effective contract
incentives. [Ref. 2]
The implementation of Government programs (extra-
contractual objectives) carry an associated myriad of
mandatory contractor reporting and data requirements.
17

Unfortunately, it appears that the attainment of these
extra-contractual Government objectives acts as a disincen-
tive to contractors and often precludes the attainment of
associated contractor goals.
D. SUMMARY
The determination of how bast to motivate Government
contractors requires an in-depth understanding of the inter-
relationship of the contractor objectives, Government
objectives, and the unique Defense acquisition environment.
The Government and contractors must also understand the
requlatory constraints restricting both Government flexi-
bility and available incentives to motivate contractors.
Chapter three addresses the current DoD Incentive
Contracting Policy, its effectiveness, and the problems with
this policy as it is now administered.
13

in. DOD INCENTIVE CONTP ACTING
A. DEVELCPHEHT
It is stated in GENESIS that where discretion exists it
is apt to be exercised, and that to uerely charge someone to
be a good and faithful servant is not adequate to secure his
performance. The Department of Defense attempts to secure
performance by writing contracts which limit the contrac-
tor's discretion throughout the acquisition process. For
example, if the nature of the end item limited the contrac-
tor's discretion with regard to its total cost and technical
performance but provided relatively nore discretion
regarding the delivery schedule, then the DoD contracting
officer might incorporate a delivery-date incentive into the
contract in order to encourage early delivery. [Ref. 12]
Incentive contracts are by no means a contemporary inno-
vation. Both the warship H cnitor of the Civil War and the
Wright brothers' " hea vier-t han-air" machine were acquired
under incentive contracts. The Monitor had to float, attain
a minimum speed, and win its first battle before the
contractor was paid. The Wright brothers received a 35,000
bonus, in addition to their 525,000 oontract price, when
their flying machine exceeded the target speed by more than
two miles per hour. [Ref. 13]
In an effort to expend public fup.ds more efficiently,
the techniques of incentive contracting have received ever
increasing emphasis within DoD since the early 1960' s. This
extensive use of incentive contracts can be directly traced
to the efforts of then Secretary of Defense Robert S.
HcNamara, under whose purview the original DoD Incentive
Contracting Guide was published in 1962. Although somewhat
19

dated, the 1969 revised edition of the Guide remains a basic
reference for current DoD incentive contracting policies and
procedures. DoD has historically relied on two concepts to
limit the discretion of the contractors and encourage them
to make trade-offs which benefit the Government. First, the
contract terms and conditions legally require certain
actions and prohibit others. Second, DoD expects the profit
goal to motivate the contractor to complete the contract in
a manner that is beneficial to the Government. Thus, as
stated in the Guide:
"The profit motive is the essence of incentive
contracting. Incentive contracts utilize the drive fcr
financial gain under risk conditions by rewarding the
contractor through increased profit for attaining cost
(and sometimes performance ana si'
b<
by penalizing him through reduced p
(target) expected levels." [ Ref . t4 ]
The Guide also recognizes, however, that other extra-
contractual factors can bs significant motivators to the
Defense contractor. These include growth; new product
.
development; prestige; improved public image; social
approval; national defense goals; potential for follow-on
business; commercial application; excess capacities;
increased profits on other contracts through shared over-
head; and excelling for the sake of excellence. (See
Appendix 3). Also, according to the Guide, DoD "recognizes
that contractors will, generally, optimize- not maximize-
profit." This follows Herbert A. Simon's theory that a
decision maker cannot pretend to know all possible options;
at best he can only satisfy goals, not maximize them
[Ref. 15]. The Guide recommends that when non-profit
motives are apparent, they should be considered in the
structure of incentive contracts. But this recommended use
of extra-contractual motivators is limited since such
20

factors are often beyond the control of the DoD contracting
officer. Their recommended use has not been incorporated
into the Defense Acquisition Regulations in any significant
manner.
It was thought by HcNamara and his systems analyst advi-
sors, that to harness the profit motive through incentive
arrangements would improve both cost control and contract
performance. Prior to this time, the DoD acquisition
picture was not one of thrift. The argent requirements of
the Korean conflict were quickly followed by the start c*
both the exciting and very costly space race and the even
more expensive nuclear arms race. Compressed time schedules
and complex performance requirements during this period when
technical risks were extremely high aeant great reliance on
the cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) contract type. This resulted
in frequent cost overruns with less than spectacular
results. The fixed fee of the CPFF contract, coupled with
full cost reimbursement, provided zero incentives for the
contractor to control costs. Fortunately, those with
sounder management backgrounds saw that such contracting did
not differentiate between good or bad performance, or proper
management control of costs and waste. The emphasis then
shifted to the other end of the risk spectrum with encour-
agement for expanded use of the f irm- f i xed-price (FFP) type
of contract for major weapon system development. Defense
Contractors were enticed by the reduced risks of the newly
developed total package procurement concept. This was an
effort in which the developer, by his participation in the
initial competition, was entitled to substantial production
quantities downstream. The stated objectives, however, were
not met because contractors made substantial production
commitments to meet contract delivery schedules before
design and cost efforts were complets. The result was
extensive, and costly, redesign and rework. [Ref. 16]
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Thus, during the early 1960's, the official DoD policy
was changed to encourage the increased use of incentive
contracts, and this policy is basically the one being
followed throughout DoD alaost two decades la^er. David
Packard, former Deputy Secretary of Defense, reiterated the
DoD position in 1971 in the fall issue of the Defense
Management Journal:
"I firmly believe that development contracts for new
weapons svstems should almost always be cost incentive
contracts) which provide the flexibility necessary for
sound development. Further, simple incentives can be
used to rewar.d a contractor for good perfomance and to
penalize him for a poor one..." [Ref. 17]
As stated in the introduction of this study, this
emphasis on incentive contracting continues to the present.
B. CURRENT POLICY
It is current DoD policy to use a contract type that is
consistent with the stage of program development and its
inherent level of risk. CPFF can be the appropriate
contract type when a high degree of technical and cost
uncertainty exists. Once preliminary exploration has been
accomplished, and the Government has generally determined
performance objectives and schedule, the arena of incentive
contracting can be entered. As a means of controlling cost
and improving contract performance, the contractor is
expected to share the risk associated with the respective
stage of item development. By harnessing the contractor's
profit motive to work toward effective and efficient
contract performance, it is assumed that the contractor will
accept ever increasing amounts of risk as uncertainties
diminish. Eventually, he will reach the point where he
assumes almost all risk, as would be the case in an FF? type
of contract. At this point, assuming the contractor is
22

profit oriented, he would lo everything possible to minimiz*
costs, resulting in contract performance at or below target
cost, with an end product which met or exceeded stated spec-
ifications. Between these two extremes of cost and
technical risk a r.d uncertainty- FFP and CPFF- lies the
greatest challenge for effectively motivating the contrac-
tors. Herein lies the arena of incentive contracting.
The Defense Acguisiton Regulations (DAP.) state,
"Profit, generally, is the basic motive of business
enterprise... The objective shouli be to insure that
outstandingly effective and economical performance is
met by high profits, mediocre performance by aediocre
profits, and poor performance by low profits to losses."
[Ref. 1§]
Recognizing DoD desires to pay for performance in this
correlative manner, and to assign contract risk as a func-
tion of end item definition, the DAR has been written to
provide for a variety of contract types. This allows for
contractual relationships wherein the contractor can provide
a good product, and at the same time effectively minimize
costs, in an effort to maximize profits. Theoretically, the
contract can be structured by both parties so as to equit-
ably share the risk, and this sharing would continue in
fcllcw-on contracts to tha point where specifications and
cost estimates are sufficiently solidified and an FFP
contract can be successfully employed. The best and most
complete description of the various contract types can be
found in Section III of the DAR, but for purposes of this
study the general guidelines referenced for use in the
incentive contracting environment are listed below, as spec-
ified in the DoD Incentive Contracting Guide:
1. Fixed- Price-Incentive-Fee (FPI) (Cost Incentive Only).
Appropriate where confidence in achieving performance




2. Fixed-Price-Incentive-Fes (FPI) (Multiple
Incentives). Appropriate where improved performance
is desire c and technical and cost uncertainties can
be reasonably identified.
3. Cost-Pius -Incentive- Fee (CPIF) (Cost Incentive Only).
Appropriate where a given level of performance is
desired and confidence in achieving that performance
level is reasonably good but where technical and cost
uncertainty is excessive for use of a fixed-price
incentive
.
U. Cost-Plus -Incentive- Fee (CPIF) (Multiple Incentives).
Appropriate whera expectation of achieving an accep-
table performance is good but improvement over that
level is desired and where technical and cost uncer-
tainties are excassive for use of FPI.
5. Cost-Pius -Award-Fee (CPAF) . Appropriate where condi-
tions for use of a 3PFF are present but where
improved performance is also desired and where
performance cannot be measure! objectively.
[Ref. 14]
In CPIF and FPI contracts the share ratio technique is
used to determine the Government and contractor responsi-
bility for cost. This provides the neans to increase or
decrease the profit of the contractor as a function of the
cost to the Government. The limitation of a ceiling price
is imposed under an FPI contract, while CPIF contracts limit
the sharing over a range of incentive effectiveness (FIE)
.
When objectives cannot be measured easily, but it is felt
that performance can be incentivized, the CPAF contract
provides for a subjective (and unilateral) evaluation
process to determine award. Consequently good performance
by the contractor (as interpreted by the Government) will
lead to a high award fee, and poor performance to a lew
award fee, or a penalty. As indicated above, both CPIF and
24

FPI contracts can include multiple incentives on a combi-
natory of cost, performance and schedule (but all must
include a cost incentive). The Guide states,
"Multiple incentive contracting combines the motiva-
tion for technological progress, timely delivery, and
effective cost control with the ultimate object of
attaining an appropriate balance between performance,
schedule and cost control— not necessarily the lowest
cost. Obviously, in cost only incentives, the emphasis
is on the stated performance achievement at the lowest
cost." [Ref. 14]
Theoretically, a properly structured contract should
communicate the Government's objectives to the contractor.
The objective, therefore, of multiple incentive contracts is
to encourage appropriate trade-offs between cost, schedule
and performance which will yield maximum benefit to both
parties. It is worth repeating, however, that profit
remains the prime motivator in Government incentive
contracting.
C. EFFECTIVENESS
Anv general understanding of DoD incentive contracting
would be incomplete without at least a summary overview of
the perceived effectiveness of this contract type. Although
assessment of the effectiveness of incentive contracts is
not cne of the objectives Df this study, the authors found a
review of this area most helpful in preparing and analyzing
the survey. Sinc*= the effectiveness :£ incentives as instru-
ments of mo-ivation cannot be measured simply by examining
contract results, the authDrs examined instead the results
of several excellent prior studies in this area. While not
all of these studies resulted in exactly the same findings,
the ten presented herein are ones with which most of the
studies either concurred or did not disagree. Six of the
findings reflect unfavorably on incentive contracting:
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1. Extra-contractual considerations dominate over profit
or fee. A contractor rarely seeks to maximize proit
during the short run cf a single contract.
2. Incentives have not been significantly effective as
protection against cost growth on major programs,
even when such growth has been adjusted for high
inflation
.
3. Contractors establish internal upper limits on
profits on Government contracts, primarily to avoid
the appearance of profiteering.
U. Incentives are costly to negotiate and administer, to
both the Government and contractors.
5. Contractors will not sacrifice performance attainment
for profit. Performance is of such paramount impor-
tance to company inage and future business
acguisiticns that all performmce incentives provide
little, if any, additional motivation to the
contract o r.
6. It is often impossible to pass incentive motivation
to the people who carry out the con-ract effort en a
day-to-day basis, primarily because it is difficult
to relate individual activity with any specific
contract
.
The last four findings relate to the favorable aspects
of incentives:
7. Incentives do not work to the disadvantage of the
Government. When a contractor discovers that his
incentive arrangements do not correspond to the
Government's interests, he ignores the incentive.
8. Incentives serve to discipline the planning efforts
of DoD personnel. if hen an incentive arrangement is
to be negotiated, requirements analysis is more thor-
ough and the work statement is more precise.
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9. Incentive structures more clearly communicate the
Government objectives to the contractor.
10. When it is possible to associite the activities of
individual workers with specific contracts, incen-
tives provide a useful motivational tool.
There is, in summary, no compelling evidence that incen-
tive contracting is working. Most Government contractors
have such strong motivation to emphasize performance attain-
ment that performace incentives may be unnecessary. The use
of incentives has, however, produced more thorough
Government acquisition planning and more complete and
precise communication of procurement objectives to the
contractor. [Ref. 19]
D. CURRENT PROBLEMS
If one accepts the overwhelming evidence that incentive
contracting is net effective, then one must naturally wonder
what the problems are. In the courss of researching this
question, the authors found common agreement on two major
problems. First, the Government has never been very adept
at determining an appropriate target cost- an essential
element of all incentive contracts. If the target cost is
too high, there can be little incentive for the contractor
to reduce costs. The resulting underruns in this case will
be unrelated to any real cost savings or increased effi-
ciency. On the other hand, if target cost is too low the
contractor stands little chance of meeting it without
impacting product quality and contract performance, and will
eventually ignore the incentive. It is apparent that one
key to effective incentive contracting is to obtain real-




The second major problem, which is more difficult to
deal wi+ h, is DoD's basic policy that in order for incentive
contracting to be effective, defense contractors must be
motivated primarily by extra profits. This policy ignores
the extra-contractual motivators which may be of more para-
mount importance to the contractor, and it usually conflicts
with the Government's objective of minimizing procurement
costs. This brings us to the basic question which this
research was intended to address- What are the factors which
motivate defense contractors? The last two chapters will
present our evidence and eiggest some answers to what has
proven to be a very difficult question.
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IV, PRESENTATION OF SURVEY DATA
A. INTRODUCTION
As was discussed in Chapter II, *:here are many factors
other than profit which ssrve to motivate Defense contrac-
tors. Despite this fact, the Department of Defense rarely
attempts to include any of these factors in its contracts as
a means of incen tivizing the contractor's performance. As
was shown in Chapter III, profit remains the essence of
incentive contracting within DoD. Although the DoD
Incentive Contracting Guide recognizes the existence of
these other factors, it describes th = m as "extra-
contractual" factors and nakes no attempt to identify a
means of utilizing them in an effort to motivate the
contractor through the incentive contract vehicle (see
Appendix B) . This apparent inconsistency is what stimulated
the authors' interest in the subject, and formed the basis
for our primary research guestion. tfhile our original
intent was to conduct the survey frou the perspective of the
entire DcD, our review of the available research revealed
that a void existed only with respect to the Department of
Navy. In order to fill this void, and to compare our
results with those of prior surveys, the authors intention-
ally limited the ranqe of respondents to DcN major weapons
system program offices and their respective contractors.
After a brief discussion Df the survey development, we will
present the data in three distinct phases. The first
section will be an independent review of the demographic
characteristics of the population sample. The second
section will display and discuss the rssults of the four
questions dealing with contractual goals and objectives.
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incentives, and disincentives. The final section will be a
purely subjective analysis of the responses to the last
survey question. Although a survey of the entire population
would have been theoretically ideal, practical considera-
tions dictated otherwise and we sought only to achieve a
sample large enough to permit extrapolation of the data to
the whole population. The basis for doing so is the Central
Limit Theorem, which may be stated as follows:
If n (the sample size) is large, the theoretical
sampling distribution of the mean can be approximated
closely with a normal distribution [Ref. 20 ].
This theorem is of fundamental importance in statistics,
since it justifies the use of normal-curve methods to esti-
mate infinite populations based on the results of sampling a
small portion of the whole. It is difficult to say
precisely how large n must be so that the Central Limit
Theorem applies, but n=30 is usually regarded as suffi-
ciently large. Thus, one of our considerations was to
achieve a sample larger than 3D from both subgroups of the
population.
B. SURVEY DEVELOPMENT
Our primary consideration in developing the survey ques-
tionnaires was, cf course, to enable us to answer both the
primary and ancillary research questions. To achieve this
we borrowed heavily from the ideas of some of the prior
studies. Another egually important consideration was our
decision to conduct the survey by phone. A review of many
previous studies which utilized written surveys indicated
that an adequate number of responses were obtained only as a
result of an intensive phone follow-up campaign. This,
coupled with our desire to receive spontaneous.
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non-attributional responses, lsd us to conclude that a phone
survey would best serve our purposes. The implications of
this decision were threefold: first, the total number of
questions had to be limited because of the time factor
involved; second, the questions had to be structured such
that the respondents could readily comprehend what was being
asked without frequent repeats; and third, we wanted to
avoid providing the respondents with a "shopping list" of
possible choices in order to preclude biasing their
responses. Our final consideration was a desire to collect
a limited amount of background information about the
contractors. This data included:
1. Company size
2. Manufacturing process
3. Amount of government sales
4. Type of business
5. Predominant contract type
6. Nature of competition
Responses to the demographic questions were solicited
from both sample groups in order to get a feeling for how
well the two parties understood the basic composition of the
contractors' organization, and to determine whether or net
differences in their understanding would effect their
responses to the non-demographic questions.
With these considerations identified, and the demo-
graphic questions completed, the authors then developed the
questions designed to determine the factors which motivate
DoN major contractors. In order to do this the authors
decided to concentrate on three distinct types of factors:





Accordingly, the first two survey questions wers
designed so that the authors could develop a prioritized
list of both Government and industry contractual goals and
objectives from the perspective of both parties. These
findings could then be compared with both parties' percep-
tions of each others goals and objectives. Next, both the
contractor and Government perceptions of the three most
effective contract incentives were solicited. Additionally,
each respondent was asked for their perceptions of the top
three factors which tend to inhibit oontract performance,
which the authors identify as contract disincentives. The
final guestion solicited the opinions of both parties as to
how the Government could better motivate contractors through
the contracting process.
A copy of each survey questionnaire is contained in
Appendix A.
C. SURVEY RESPONSES
Our search for respondents began with a roster of DoN
Program Managers (PM) , Procuring Contracting Officers (PCO)
,
and Program Business/Financial Managers (B/FM) associated
with maicr weapon system programs. Each time these
personnel were surveyed, they were asked to provide names
and phone numbers of their contractor counterparts. Some of
the Government personnel provided sioce than one name and
phone number, which is why the total contractor sample is
larger than the total Government sample. Thirty-four
Government personnel and forty-two contractors were





More than 70% of the contractors surveyed were
employed by large corporations with a workforce in excess of
10,000 employees. One might have expected that percentage
to be much higher since the survey was aimed primarily at
major weapon system contractors, but the sample population
did include several companies who were subcontractors.
Also, many of the companies were very capital intensive and
would, therefore, have a relatively smaller workforce. Both
the Government personnel and the contractors yielded approx-
imately the same relative percentages in responding to this
guest ion.
Both groups also categorized the companies' manufac-
turing process nearly identically. About 41% of the firms
are predominantly labor intensive, 15* are capital intensive
and almost U3% said they are balanced between capital and
labor. Many of the latter respondents indicated, however,
that their company was transitioning toward a more capital
intensive type of process.
An overwhelming majority (81*.) of the companies rely
on Government sales for more than half of their revenue.
As one of the company Vice Presidents noted to the authors
during the interview, it is difficult to find a commercial
market for ballistic missiles. There was a small disparity
between the responses of the two groups on this question, as
shown in Table I. The most logical explanation of the
differences is the spontaneous nature of the survey method.
The respondents were not given the opportunity to research
exact figures on company sales, but rather were asked to
provide their best estimates.
Over 85% of the contractors indicated that a combi-
nation of production and basic research and development best


























predominant. The remaining 15* were evenly split between
services and a combination of all three. Again there was
general agreement between both groups of respondents on this
•guest ion.
The guestion regarding predominant type of contract
resulted in the largest disparity between the two groups,
and was generally regarded as the most, difficult guestion to
answer. As can te. seen in Table II, however, both groups
TABLE II





























selected Fixed-Price Incentive (FPI) most frequently. The
differences can be explained in part by the fact that a good
number of the companies had contracts with federal agencies
other than DoN, and in part by the spontaneous nature of the
methodology discussed previously. The "other" category
represents those respondents who fait that no one contract
type was predominant.
When one considers the highly technical complexity
of DoN major weapon systems, it was not surprising to the
authors that the majority of the respondents considered
technical competition as the best description of the nature
of their competitive environment. Both groups perceived
technical competition as predominant, with only 14%
selecting non-competitive and 25% choosing price competi-
tion. The fact that 86% of all DoN major weapon system
contractors function within a competitive environment is
encouraging.
In summary, the "typical" DoN major weapon system
contractor can be described as a large, production-oriented
corporation, producing primarily for Government sales, with
an even mix of capital arJ labor, utilizing the entire spec-
trum of contract types, within a highly competitive
environment. The next section discusses the motivation and
incentivization of this "typical" contractor.
2- Industry Contractual Goals and Objectives
Chapter II discussed the importance of first identi-
fying organizational goals and objectives when attempting to
influence or explain that organization's behavior.
Following this theory, major DoN contractors were asked in
question 2 of Section II to identify the top three contrac-
tual goals or objectives which motivated •'hem to seek and
perform a recent Government contract. Responses to this
question were classified into three distinct cateaories:
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1. Financial objectives. These are objectives that, if
achieved, would improve the overall financial
position of the firm, and include potential for
improved cash flow, additional profit and increased
return on investment.
2. Strategic goals. These goals refer to the long-range
company objectives. These goals generally are estab-
lished by corporate management and provide the firm
with overall direction and guidance that influences
the development and attainment of short-term goals
and objectives. Examples include company survival,
company growth, develop a long-term contractual rela-
tionship, increase or maintain market share, and
develop or maintain the workforce.
3. Reputation objectives. This category of contractor
objectives refers to maintaining or enhancing
contractor image. Providing a good guality product,
enhancing public image, and ensuring on-time delivery
are examples of reputation objectives.
Table III displays contractor and Government
responses to guestion 2 of Section II in the survey. Note
that 44.1% of all of the contractor goals and objectives
provided, fell within the strategic objective category, with
financial and reputation objectives accounting for 30.9% and
24.6% respectively. When the number one contractor objec-
tive is reviewed separately, the gap between strategic and
financial objectives increases, with 45.2% of the contrac-
tors claiming their number one contractual objective to be
strategic in nature and only 23.6% identifying a financial
objective as their prime consideration. Government
personnel placed much more emphasis on the contractor's
financial goals than did the contractor, with the Government
identifying 40.2% of all contractors goals as financial.
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and contractor responses to the number one contractor objec-
tive. Financial objectives were identified by 44.2% of the
Government personnel as the number or.s contractor considera-
tion, while the contractors named financial goals number one
only 28.6% of the time. Almost equally important to the
contractors were its reputation objectives. Objectives in
this category were listed by the contractor 26.5% of the
time, while only 5.8"* of the Government respondents identi-
fied reputation objectives as number one.
A more detailed examination Df industry and
Government perceptions of contractual objectives reveals
several interesting findings. As shown in Table IV, both
the contractors and the Government felt that profit was the
contractors' number one objective. However, equally impor-
tant to the contractors, and tied for number one at 26.2%,
was the reputation objective of providing a good product,
followed closely by strategic objectives of company survival
and company growth. The fact that 83.1% of the contractors
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4 Company growth
5 Increase cash flow
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7 Provide a good product
Note: This column represents tha percentage of










company survival, or comoany growth as the number one
contractual objective was not surprising. In the words of
one Defense contractor corporate officer,
"They (contractor objectives) are so closely
interrelated, it is difficult to rank one above the
other or claim to have oie objective without the other
one., we're all in this business to make money... Sc to
say profit is not a primary objective would be wrong.
But it is not the only objective... Of course we want to
survive and arow. But without a good reputation and
adeguate profits we are out of business. All four,
company survival, company growth, oromotina the compa-
ny's reputation, and prorit are primary objectives on
each and every Government contract. No one objective is
more important than the other."
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The Government, on the other hand, perceived profit
to be the primary contractor objective with 38.3% of the
Government respondents listing profit/ROI as number one.
The contractor's reputation objective of providing a good
product received a number one ranking by only 5.8% of the
Government personnel interviewed. Since this objective tied
with profit for the top spot in the contractor poll, it
would appear that the contractors are much more consciously
aware and concerned that the company reputation is on the
line with every single contract.
These findings on Government and contractor opinions
of contractor objectives generally support the findings of
the APRO study. That study also found that providing a good
product ranked number one to the contractors, while ranking
seventh among the Government employees surveyed. Profit was
also found by APEO to be the number one objective according
to Government opinion, while it ranked fourth amoung
contractors belov; providing a good product, maintaining a
long-term relationship, and improving cash flow. (APRO, 132)
Disparities between Government and industry percep-
tions of contractor objectives discussed above can be part
of the reason for the ineffectiveness of existing DoD incen-
tive contracting policies. Additionally, this study locked
at both parties' perceptions of Government contractual
objectives. The next section discusses the findings
concerning this element of the contractual relationship.
3- G oy er nm e nt Contractual Goals and Objectives
Question one of Section II in both the Government
and contractor guestionnair es identified the three primary
objectives of the Government on any contract as (1)
obtaining a fair and reasonable pries; (2) on-time delivery;
and (3) meeting the specifications of the contract. Each
respondent was requested to rank the three Government
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objectives listed above according to their perception of the
Government's priorities. Responses were tallied, averaged,
TABLE ?
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and the results are displayed in Table V.
Both Government and contractor personnel feel
strongly that meeting the specifications of the contract is
the most important objective of the Government. The
Government believes that on -time delivery is second most
important and that price is least important of the three
objectives ranked. The contractors believed price was
second most important to the Government and delivery third.
The questionnaire results 3o indicate the Government does
have definite priorities for its objectives, and that it has
made clear to industry that meeting the specifications is
most important. However, industries' perception that price
is more important to the Government than on-time delivery is
not in line with Government desires. The Business Financial
Manager on one of the Navy's major weapon system projects




fair price. But it has been my
emphasis has been placed on precluding cost overruns,
that conceivably, cur objectives have been misread by
our contractors."
This misreading by industry (or mistransmission by
the Government) could also explain, in part, the perception
that incentive contracting is not working. If the contrac-
tors perceive price to be more important than delivery, the
delivery objective will, if necessary, be traded off to
achieve meeting both the contract specifications and price
objectives. However, had the true Government objectives
been made clear, perhaps a different course of action would
have been pursued, and tha contract performance ultimately
deemed good.
These results also support the findings of the APRO
study [Ref. 2].
1 • Contract Performance Incentives
An incentive is anything which will improve a
contractor's motivation to perform. !lany methods of incen-
tivizing Government contracts have been employed over the
years. In an effort to gauge the success of these incen-
tives, Government and industry respondents were asked to
list and rank the top three incentives (in terms of effec-
tiveness) which have been utilized on their recent
Government contracts. Table VI displays the results of -his
guest ion.
The incentives mentioned by the respondents were
categorized into three groups; contract-type incentives
(incentivizing through a pa rticular" contract pricing
arrangement- e.g., incentive fee contracts, award fee
contracts), contract-pro vis ion incentives (those incentives




Survey Responses on Contractual Incentives
Incentive Contractor Government
percent/ (rank) percent/ (rank)

















High profit 9.5 (4) 16.7 (2)
Improved cash flow 19.8 (2) 10.7 (4)
Monetary loss for poor
performance - - 2.0 (10)




tection by Govt." 11.1 (3) 4.9 (8)
Guarantee of future
business 9.5 (4) 10.7 (4)
Evaluation cf past
performance 5.6 (7) 3.9
Gooa working relation 4.8 (8) 5.9
Long term funded contract 3.2
Source of RDTSE funds 2.4
Total 36.6 34.2
Note: Percent columns represent percentage of respon-j
dents that identified the" incentive as one of their
top three. j
of a contract- e.g., improved cash flow, high profit, and
EPA clauses), and extra-contractual incentives (those incen-
tives not specifically provided for rfithin the contract-
e.g., capital investment protection, and evaluation of past
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performance as a source selection criteria). On an
aggregate group basis, both Government and industry
responses were very similar. 34.1% of the contractor incen-
tives mentioned fell into the contract-type incentive
category while the Government had 35.4%. Contract provision
incentives accounted for 29.3% of the contractors' responses
as well as 30.4% of the Government's. Finally, the extra-
contractual incentive provisions were mentioned as "top
three" incentives 36.6% and 34.2% of the time by contractor
and Government respondents respectively.
This aggregate similarity is somewhat misleading.
The three most freguently mentioned effective incentives by
contractors are in order of priority, as follows: (1) incen-
tive fees; (2) improving rash flow; and (3) Government-
provided capital investment protection. Guarantee of future
business and high profit were both fourth on the contrac-
tor's list of effective incentives. The Government,
however, responded with the following: (1) incentive fees;
(2) high profit; and (3) award fees. Improved cash flow and
guarantee of future business, both were mentioned 10.7% of
the time by Government respondents which tied them for
fourth. Both parties agreed that incentive fees, improving
cash flow, guarantee of future business, and high profits
are effective incentives. However, award fees, which ranked
third on the Government's list, did not appear until sixth
on the contractor list of effective incentives. Similarly,
the contractors surveyed ranked Government capital invest-
ment protection third; while the Government, apparently
thinking it less effective as an incentive, ranked it
eighth. It does appear that monetary reward incentives
(high profit, incentive fees) and risk reducing, extra-
contractual rewards (guarantee of future business and




This finding substantiates the results of the APRO
study in this area. However, the APRO study identified fair
and equitable contract, guarantee of future business,
program continuity, and appropriate contract type as the
four strongest industry incentives. Guarantee of future
business, program continuity, profit, and fair and equitable
contract were identified by APRO as the four most effective
incentives in the Government's opinion. [ Ref . 2]
The differences between this study and the APRO
research findings can best be explained by the differences
in survey questionnaire design. The APRO surve.y provided a
list of possible incentives which were to be rank ordered
based upon effectiveness. It was the intent of our survey
to solicit spontaneous reponses without biasing the answers
received. Incentives like fair and equitable contract and
appropriate contract type appear in the APRO study as impor-
tant incentives only because respondents selected them from
a "shopping list". They are not, in the opinion of the
authors of this study, effective contract incentives because
the contractor is not consciously aware of their existence
as incentives. They do not improve a contractor's motiva-
tion to perform. This is not to say however, that they are
not important attributes of a good contract. In fact, the
absence of a fair and equitable contract or existence of an
inappropriate contract type, will undoubtedly negatively
affect the contractor's motivation. These factors are
called contract disincentives and are the subject of the
next section.
5 • Contract Disincentives
Numerous Government actions, policies and regula-
tions have tended to serve as disincentives to Government
contractors. In an effort to ocmpil= a list of these disin-
centives, industry and Government personnel were requested
uu

to identify the top three contractual disincentives that
confronted their company (or in the 3o vernment ' s case, the
company with which they did business) . The following
comment was typical of the responses received to the
question
.
"Over regulation, over regulation, over regula-
tion." -Navy ECO of a major weapon system project.
This was undoubtedly the easiest question for both
sample groups to answer. Table VII provides a summary of
the findings.
The disincentives identified were categorized into
four basic groups, (1) Bureaucratic-induced. Those factors
that inhibit contract performance attributable to a "cost of
doing business with the Government", (e.g., excessive paper-
work, over regulation, government interference); (2)
Financial disincentives. Those factors that may impact
negatively on a contractor's financial posture, (e.g.,
unallowable costs, weighted guidelines, Government preoccu-
pation with low price); (3) Factors due to poor Government
planning. (e,g, Program instability, inadequate lead time,
excessive number of contract changes) ; (4) Sovereign-
induced. Those disincentives resulting from programs estab-
lished by the Government to promote =conomic and/or social
policies of the Nation. (e.g., Socio-economic programs and
Government emphasis on competition).
Over half (50.1%) of all disincentives mentioned by
the contractors fell into the bureaucratic-induced category,
with poor planning, sovereign- induced, and financial disin-
centives representing 19.9%, 15.1% and *\2% respectively.
The Government also felt the bureaucratic-induced disincen-
tives were the predominate problems followed by financial,




Survey Responses on Contractual Disincentives
Contractor Government
Disincentives pe rcent/ (r ank) percent/ (rank)
A. Bureaucratic-inducei
Over regulation 21.5 (1) 19.7
ill
Excessive paperwork 12.7 (4) 12.7 (4^
Undue delays - - 1.0
Total 50. 1 39.3
B. Financial
Weighted guidelines 2.U (10) 6.9 (5)
Lack of capital protection - - 1.0 (13)
Preoccupation with low price 5.6 (6) 4.9 (8)
Unallowable costs 3.2 [8\ 3.9 (9)
Lack of up- front funding .8 (12) 3.9 (9)
Total 12.0 20.6
C. Poor government planning
Program instability 11.9 (5) 14.7 (2)
Poor sp«cs/excessive
contract changes 2.4 (10) 5.9 (6)





14.3 (3) 13.7 (3)
Emphasis on competition .8 (12)
Total 15.1 13.7
E. Other
Lack of contractual relation 3.2 (8) 3.9 (9)
To^al 3.2 3.9
Note: Percent columns represent percentage of
respondents that identified zhe disincentive as
one of their top three.
46

contractor personnel cited over-regulation as the primary
disincentive. This was closely followed by Government
interference, socio-economic requirements, excessive paper-
work, and program instability. Government over-regulation
was also cited most frequently by Government personnel
surveyed, followed by program instability, socio-economic
requirements, and excessive paperwork:.
"Incentive contracting! If you want to incen-
tivize me, leave me alone and let me run my defense
business like I run my commercial business." -Director
of Contracts, major defense contractor.
While this comment reflects the opinion of many of
the contractors responding to the survey (Government inter-
ference ranked second from the top on the disincentives
list). Government personnel only ranged Government interfer-
ence in a tie for sixth. Since the other major
disincentives cited by contractors appeared equally high en
the Government's list, we can assume that at least the
Government is aware of these problems. However, the
Government apparently is unaware that interference is viewed
as a major contract disincentive and may be negatively moti-
vating the contractor. The final section of this chapter
discusses some of the opinions of the respondents as to how
these problems might be overcome.
6 • k Better Wav?
The purpose of the final question in the survey was
to provide to '-.he respondents the opportunity to state their
opinions concerning ways to better motivate Government
contractors through the acquisition process. The authors
felt it was important to let the people who function so
closely within the system express their views on the
subject, despite the subjective nature of the question.
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Because of oar commitment to non-attribution, the responses
will not be presented as quotable material, and the
analysis, like the question itself, must be considered
sub jective.
The responses can be grouped, in general, into one
of two distinct, yet related, categories: (1) eliminate the
factors identified as disincentives; and (2) actively imple-
ment the Defense Acquisition Improvement Program (DAI?) . A
large number of the respondents answered question five with
a simple, "Fix ques-ion four", meaning, of course, to elimi-
nate the pr cblems which the y had just identified as
disincentives in responding to ques-ion four. Additionally,
several of the respondents, during a general discussion of
their opinions on the subject, reiterated their disincen-
tives. If, for example, they had responded with program
instability as one of their top three disincentives, they
would also identify increased prograa stability as a means
of better motivating the contractor. The -fact that: the two
questions w«re asked successively may have influenced, to
some degree, the train of thought of the respondents.
From a simple, "Push the CarLucci initiatives", to a
half-hour dissertation on the benefits of multi-year
procurement, it was obvious to the authors that the vast
majority of the respondents viewed the DAIP as a key to
improving the manner in which DoN procures major weapon
systems, and thereby improving the motivation of its
contractors. With very few exceptions, nearly every one of
the initiatives was mentioned at least once during the
seventy-six phone conversations, and nearly every respondent
mentioned at least one of the initiatives. A review of
Table VII reveals a better than 90& correlation between the
disincentives and the problems identified by th a DAIP.
Thus, although the two categories of responses to the last




Finally, one frequent response which does not really
fit into either of the above categories was to structure the
federal acquisition process more in line with commercial
procurement practices. While this concept can be debated,
at some length, a complete discussion of this subject is
considered beyond the scope of this study. Instead, the
authors suggest that this topic might be worthy of a sepa-
rate research effort.
D. SUHMARY
The main focus of this chapter has been to reflect the
major opinions of both industry and Government personnel,
regarding contractual goals and objectives, incentives and
disincentives. This was accomplished by examining the
responses to telephone interviews conducted by "he- authors.
During these telephone interviews a tailored version of the
APRO questionnaire was administered [ Ref . 2]. Additionally,
respondents were afforded an opportunity to provide sugges-
tions on how the Government could better motivate its
contractors through the acquisition process. The responses
to each of the survey questions, where applicable, were
summarized in tables or narrative forn. Chapter V will
utilize the data analysis presented here to draw conclusions
and make pertinent recommendations.
Finally, the authors attempted to correlate the major
cateqories of the demographic lata with the responses to the
other survey questions. The purpose of doing so was to
determine whether or not the differences in the nature of
the contractor's organizations would yield differences in
the nature of the goals and objectives, motivation, and
incentives of the various companies. The results of this
effort revealed no significant differences, and were there-
fore not presented in this report.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND R2COHHENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
1. The range of factors which motivate DoN major weapon
system contractors is both large and extremely complex.
These factors not only vary widely between organizations,
but are also different among the various levels of manage-
ment in any one organization. The Government perceives the
short-term monetary objectives such as profit, cash flow and
ROI to be the key motivators. The contractors express more
interest in the long-term strategic objectives such as
company survival and growth and the reputation objectives of
producing a quality product and ensuring proper performance.
Both parties agree, however, -hat profit is one of the key
factors, and -hat incentive fees which can result in higher
profits are an effective means of motivating the contractor.
2. Like the Army Procurement Research Office (APRO)
study cited previously, the authors could find no comprehen-
sive literature en the subject of Government contractual
objectives. The authors, therefore, assumed that a fair and
reasonable price, on-time delivery and meeting the specifi-
cations of the contract were the primary objectives of the
Government, with such other factors as socio-economic objec-
tives, maintenance of the industrial base and enhancement of
competition beinc secondary objectives. In responding to
this question, 1007b of the respondents concurred with this
assumption.
With respect to the relative priority of these three
primary objectives, there is little loubt that meeting the
specifications is number Die. The disparity between the two
parties concerning the other two objectives should be cause
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for considerable concern. Given a situation in which the
contractor must "trade-off" objectives (e.g. incur extra
costs in order to maintain schedule), the Government must
insure that it has communicated its priorities clearly.
According to the results of this study, such clear communi-
cation is not always happening.
3. Both industry and Government perceived monetary
rewards such as incentive fees to be the most effective
types of incentives. Industry, however, saw incentive fees
more effective than did the Government, which identified
high profits, such as can be achieved on Firm-Fixed-Price
(FFP) contracts, to be the most effective. The perceived
effectiveness of incentive fees is suprising when one
considers the many reports which show no empirical evidence
of this C Re f- 19 ]• Not surprising however, was the
perceived high degree of effectiveness within both groups
regarding improved cash flow incentives. Most often named
were such programs as flexible progress payments and mile-
stone billing. In times of high interest rates and
inflation, such programs are essential for the survival of
major weapon system contractors.
Second in perceived relative effectiveness among both
groups were the risk-reducing types of incentives such as
capital investment protection and long-term funded
contracts. While both groups rated this category, as a
whole, almost equally, industry saw capital investment
protection as more effective than dii Government personnel.
Both groups were very optimistic about the potential effec-
tiveness of multi-year contracts as an effective type of
incentive.
4. The majority of the factors identified by the sample
population as disincentives- or, factors which inhibit good
contractor performance- are generally beyond the control of
DoN personnel. These include such factors as over
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regulation, socio- economic requirements, unallowable costs
and Cos* Accounting Standards (CAS), which are mandated by
Congress. The tcp three vote gettsrs, however, are control-
lable at the DoN level and should be dealt with. Excess
Government interference and excessive paperwork are the
result of over- management of the system, which probably
results, in turn, from ths mistrust inherent in an adver-
sarial contractual relationship. Better management
practices at every level within DoN oould eliminate these
factors. Program instability, while partially the result of
such Congressional actions as budget cuts and political
infighting, is more the result of poor long-range planning.
A well-planned program, which firs into a good long-range
DoN plan for mission accomplishment, is difficult for
Congress to eliminate. The fact -hat both groups identified
essentially the same disincentives in proportionately iden-
tical degreees of concern is a good indication that both
groups are equally awara of tha problems, which is the first
step toward correcting them.
5. Analysis of the responses to the question concerning
ways to better motivate contractors leads to two major
conclusions. First, both parties are convinced that
striving to reduce the impact of the disincentive factors
will achieve better contractor motivation. Both parties
perceive this to be more important than concentrating on
more and/or better incentives. Second, both parties
perceive the Defense Acquisition Improvement Program (DAIP)
as a viable means of achieving this goal. As mentioned
previously, both of these concepts are very closely related.
On the whole, the DAIP is a program aimed at correcting the
many problems associated with the federal acquisition




6. In view cf the methodology with which the survey
sample was generated (e.g., Government personnel providing
contractor points of contact), it is the authors' opinion
that the Government personnel are not as familiar with, or
knowledgeable of, the contractor's organization as they
should be. The authors had expected a much closer match
between the two groups in their responses to the demographic
questions. While this is a very subjective conclusion, it
is probable that this failing on the Government's part may
be contributing to the inability to more effectively moti-
vate its contractors.
B. RECOHHEHDATICNS
1. DoN should develop an acquisition policy which
features not only contractor ability in preaward planning,
but also contractor motivation. Despite the complexity of
the subject, a determination of what drives the contractor's
behavior is essential to such preaward considerations as
type of contract, pricing arrangement and actual negotia-
tions. One suggested method of achieving this would be to
include a survey similar to the one utilized in this report
in all preaward surveys. For large, major weapon system
contractors a periodic survey of ail levels of the company's
management would be appropriate.
2. DoN should actively support the implementation of
the initiatives which comprise the DAIP. To date, only
thirteen of the thiry-two initiatives have been implemented,
including only three of the twelve which specifically deal
with contractor motivation and contract incentives
[Ref. 21].
3. It is recommended that additional research be
conducted in the following areas:
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a. Government contractual objectives and their effect on
contractor motivation.
b. The impact of multi- year procurement on cor.trac~or
motivation.
c. Potential of restructuring the federal acquisition
process more in line with commercial practices, and the






1 . Contract cr Demographic Question
s
1. How large is the average firm with which you do business
in terms of number of employees?
a. 1 - 100
b. 10 1 - 1,030
c. 1,001 - 10,000
a. > 10,000
2. The basic manufacturing process of the average firm with
which ycu do business can Best be described as:
a. Capital intensive
b. Labor intensive
c. 3alancsd between capital and labor
3. What percent of their total business (sales) is for
Government contracts?
a. < 10%
b. 10 - 24^
c. 25 - 49%




4. What is the primary emphasis of their Government
business?










e. No single predominant contract type
6. How would you classify the competition of the averaqe





2. 0.iie_§]:i2Il.s on Goals and Objectives, Incentives, and
Disincentives
7. It is generally accepted that the Government's three
primary objectives on any contract are: (1) a fair and
reasonable price; (2) on-time delivery; and (3) meeting the
specifications of the contract. Rank each of these for
their perceived relative importance to you.
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8. There are many contractual goals and objectives which
serve to motivate Government contractors. What do you
perceive to be the top three goals and objectives of the
firm with which you do business which motivated them to seek
and perform the contract you are currently administering,
and what is their relative priority?
9. Many methods of incenti vizing Government contracts have
been employed over the years. What do you perceive to be
the top three incentives (in terms of effectiveness) which
your office has utilized recently, and what is their rela-
tive priority?
10. Numerous Government policies, regulations and actions
have tended to serve as die incentives to Government contrac-
tors. What do y cu perceive to be the top three
disincentives currently confronting the firm with which you
do business, and what is their relative priori-y?
11. In your opinion, how could the Sovernment betzer moti-




1 • Contract cr Demographic Question
s
1. How large is your firm/divi sion in terms of number of
employees?
a. 1 - 100
b. 101-1 ,000
c. 1,001 - 10, 000
d. > 10,000




c. Balanced between capital and labor
3. What percent cf ycur total business (sales) is for
Government contracts?
a. < 10%
b. 10 - 2H%
c. 25 - H9%
d. 50 - 1U%
e. > li\%
U. What is the primary emphasis of your firm's Government
business?












e. No single predominant contract type
6. How would you classify the competition in your firm's/
division's Government business?




2. Questions on Goals and Objectives, Incentives, and
Disincentives
7. It is generally accepted that ths Government's three
primary objectives on any contract are: (1) a fair and
reasonable price; (2) on-time delivery; and (3) meeting the
specifications of the contract. Rank each of these
according to your perception cf the Government's objectives.
8. There are many contractual goals and objectives which
serve to motivate Government contractors. What do you
perceive to be your firm's/division's top three goals/
objectives which motivated you to s=ak and perform a recent
Government contract, and what is their relative priority?
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9. Many methods of incent i vizing Government contracts have
been employed over the years. What do you percsive to be
the top three incentives (in terms of effectiveness) which
year firm/divis icn has experienced on a recent Government
contract, and what is their relative priority?
10. Numerous Government policies, regulations and actions
have tended to serve as disincentives to Government contrac-
tors. What do ycu perceive to be the top three
disincentives currently confronting your firm/division, and
what is their relative priority?
11. In your opinion, how could the Government better moti-




EICERPTS FROM THE DOD AND NASA INCENTIVE CONTRACTING GUIDE
A. ADVANCED STUDIES OP INCENTIVE THEORY
1 • Extracon tract ua,l Influences in Government
Contract ing
Total, unquantified views of motivating forces have
assumed traditionally that the contractor considered the
following extraccntractual reward factors as being equal or
nearly equal to individual contract profit:
1. Company growth
New fields of business




3. Opportunity for follow-on business
Transformation to commercial business
4. Utilization of available skills and open capacity
If a contractual incentive is to affect behavior,
the values of the prospective rewards or penalties must be
greater than other rewards attainable by performance goals
geared specifically to the exrracontract ual rewards.
The Government has been engaged in studies of extra-
contractual influences upon organizational performance sine
June 1, 1967. V sry littla has been known up to now about
the behavior of contractors' organizations in relation to
the contracting process.
Organizations are complex social systems, and
contractors' organizations are composed of several smaller
systems which in turn are influenced by environments of
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professional, functional, and individual systems. To
predict the behavior of ths larger system, the Government
negotiator must consider two independent variables -- risk
and information. Risk means contractual risk, and informa-
tion means extra -contractua 1 influences. Information means
that the Government negotiator is knowledgeable about the
desires of the contractor. While risk and information are
independent variables, the relationship of the variables
will effect bargaining behavior on the part of the
contractor and should effect the bargaining behavior on the
part of the Government negotiator.
Risk involves the input of resources, the time
involved, the competition, the cost experience, functional
capabilitv, the understanding of the commitment, and the
premiums to offset risk aversion.
Information involves the amount of knowledge
concerning the contractor's desires, the strength of desire
for short-run profits, and the strength of the desires to
survive, to grow, and perhaps to maximize long-run profits.
The role of information in the development of
contract objectives and in negotiation is emerging as an
interdependent role in incentive contracting. Incentives
may be defined as premises of reward or punishment contin-
gent upon specified performances, bur any performance
environment is a complex area of interacting forces, and any
given input to motivate performance nay have unintended as
well as intended consequent es. The contractor's expectan-
cies, his desires, should be matched with the direct
motivational effects of an incentive structure to avoid
duplication and to avoid an unintended performance action
because of conflicting preferences.
In the case of most contracts, no one can insist
logically that profit (with dollars as the common denomi-
nator) is not the ultimate objective. Increased short-run
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profits assist in the attai nment of the extracontractual
profit factors, and in the long run, the extracontractual
profit factors lead also to greater opportunities for future
profits.
Many trade-offs are made in developing objectives
for the profit and extracontractual profit operations. The
top manager may want a new production facility or added
production capacity more than a new warehouse when local
warehouse space is available only under premium rental
conditions. Thus, the manager's decision is to increase
production capacity and immediate sales volume over a deci-
sion which might have been made in order to increase
prestige in "he market by increased sales, cr it might have
been made in order to keep potential competitors out of the
market. The decision also might have been made solely on
the basis that the salaries of the manager and the marketing
manager are based more on the volume of the company's sales
than on the rate of profit.
In a particular contracting situation, the
contractor may be motivated to secure a contract because the
nature of the product produced or the national visibility of
the effort under the contract will assist in recruiting
scarce engineering or scientific skills, or may assist in
the retention of key personnel. Increases in advanced tech-
nological resources are also strong extracontractual profit
factors. The magnitudes of these extracontractual rewards
may actualize profits in both current and long-run views.
The reviews of the psychologists in their studies of
extracontractual influences cover the past performance of
the contractor, as well as current performance in dealing
with expected performance. The following language of the
psychologists deal with past performance:
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"Past experience (reinf orcement history) must
include not only the direct experience of the perform-
ance but also vicarious experience. Response
dispositions can be modified by the experience of others
provided that the performer is aware or it and perceives
it to be relevant to his own situation. The experiences
of others may be instructive and may influence deci-
sions.
In discussing current status, the following view is
expressed:
"The momentary state of the performer has impor-
tance. It will serve to define what" may serve as an
incentive for performance. By 'state of the performer',
we refer to such matters as current needs, interests,
self-concepts, i.e., to prevailing relations between
current conditions and desired end results, both
internal and external."
The psychologist, assisted by economists, business
administrators, sociologists, and the scientists speaks
about expected performance under incentives in the following
manner:
"Incentives can be defined as promises of reward
or punishment (penalty) contingent upon SDecified
performances by both parties. Thus, an incentive is a
signal, evoking an anticipation of reinforcement, used
for the purpose of manipulating performance. In usage,
then, incentives refer to means-ends relationships,
goals (anticipated reinforcements), and the means
(correlated performances) for their attainment. We
might sDeak of "incentives" when the anticipation is
reward and "disincentives" when it is punishment;
however, penalty is the obverse of reward. When viewed
as a signal or message, the content of a promise (incen-
tive) is plainly germane to a consideration of its
consequences. For one thing, considering the magnitudes
of the reward and the performance event in the light of
other parameters of a total performance environment may
have the functional effect of convertina it to a disin-
centive in some other area because of conflicts. Any
given inputs are likely to have ramified consequences.
The importance of matchina the incentive both to the
propensities of a supplier and to the consumption
perferences of a user becomes obvious when the environ-
ment is to be manipulated by a contractual incentive."
In the language of the contracting world, the review
team has said that it is also necessary to weigh a given
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contract incentive against others available (actually or
potentially). The value of an incentive may vary as a func-
tion of its relations with others in the same setting and
may even impact adversely on performance under certain
conditions.
What is at issue is whether the performance will
occur because of the incentive or whether it will occur
anyway, under any type of contractual coverage with the same
cost estimate.
In partial answer to the issue, incentives should
not be misapplied. The limited motivational resources in
the profit pool should be allocated to factors that can
increase in value as a result of additional motivation. If
a contractor has built a successful marketing history and
corporate image around an "on time" theme by always meeting
promised schedules, then it may be true that an additional
incentive for schedule will be wasted. When a contractor
has an overriding long-range interest in a follow-on
program, then a strong performance incentive in a short-run
development effort may not be necessary.
The benefits from some of the extracontractual
influences accrue equally to the contractor and the
Government, if the influences are identified and quantified.
At the present time, we do not have the means to quantify
the extracontractual influences, but the identification of
some influences can certainly add such adjective weightings
as "strong" or "weak". We can also review the performers
when we consider coporate behavior and individual behavior.
The expectations of the chief scientist ana his desires for
improved performance may override the expectations of the




The recipient of incentives must have control over
ths performance which triggers the promised rewards or
penalties. He must both be perceivel to have such control
and in fact have it. If technical direction can override
the contractual directions (even by strong influences on
technical behavior) the performance incentive will not be
fully effective. Countervailing motivations must still be
considered, even in incentives which apply only to cost.
When performance is "intrinsically motivated, a
contractual incentive message may be redundant (intrinsic
motivation means the contractor or his technical personnel
do something because they "want to do it", while incentive
motivation refers to performance because they are "made to
do it") . Thus, a contractor with actual or even implied
responsibility f cr perfomance (the public may assume the
contractor has accepted responsibility) is intrinsically
motivated. When risk is involved, this effect will be
increased.
2- H§>=H!1 Non-profit Soals to Advantage
Individuals cr smaller organizational systems within
a contractor's tctal organization may establish non-profit
goals which are outside of the contractual parameters. The
influences for these goals may be found in the contractor's
overall extracon tractual "policies." Some of these goals
may be desirable, but only if they are identified and only
if the program can afford them. When they also serve to
increase contingencies, they place a barrier in front of any
attempt to maximize profits.
The contractor will not (cannot) maximize profits in
all parameters of a compartmentalize! multiple incentive
contract. The contractor will not attempt to "maximize"
profits in an FPI contract. There is no profit limit in the
FPI , and to maximize profit would assume an attempt to reach
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a profit rate of 25 percent or 40 percent based on the cost
of sales. Public opinion admit-redly and consciDusly plays a
part in the social control of contract profits. Thus,
maximizing profits in FPI contracts would always mean maxim-
izing within certain limits. In ths long run, this impacts
on the ability to reduce prices on follow-on contracts.
The contractor may attempt to maximize contract
profits at the negotiation table to offset uncertainties, or
even deficiencies in capabilities. At other times, the
attempt to maximize profits at the negotiation table may be
a technigue to start with a higher bargaining position when
the Government negotiator has not previously valued profit
parameters in accordance with the DoD Weighted Guidelines or
NASA profit factors. The profit budget, however, will
rarely reflect the maximized profit which may be obtained at
the negotiation table.
The Government negotiator can make effective use of
the non-profit gcais, the extracontractual influences,
however, deep-seated inefficiencies =nd unnecessary tech-
nical contingency factors just also be identified along with
the extracont ractual influences. If all factors, pro and
con, are identified, stronger cost incentives can be used to
correct the deep-seated inefficiencies. In this way,
benefits will continue to accure to both the Government and
industry. Technically competent "price analysts" must
perform this type of evaluation when significantly stronger
cost incentives are to be employed ii the elimination of the
deep-seated inefficiencies.
Automatic contractual incentives may be mathemati-
cally perfect, but will be imperfect in operation if the
extracontractual influences are not weighted in some manner
and used in the selection of cost ranges and performance
factors. Multidimensional profit factors should be allo-
cated en the basis of the weights of the extracontractual
67

influences on performance, schedule, and cost. This does
not mean a reduced profit, pool-- tha largest possible range
of potential realized profit variation should be continued
as a negotiation objective.
A final comment concerning the use of non-profit
goals may also provide benefits for both Government and
industry. Extr acontractual influences controlled by indi-
viduals (technical specialists! may adversely affect the
operations of otherwise efficient make-or-buy policies and
staffing plans. An in-house technical hierarchy can influ-
ence a contractor to aggrandize capabilities to "gold-plate"
performance, or capabilities for future performance, at the
expense of effectiveness on the instant contract. The costs
for this are paid in the long run by both the Government and
industry. Thus, some extracontractual influences may moti-
vate direct inefficiencies. Since redundant incentives will
perpetuate the inefficiencies, it seems extremely logical in
these situations that performance effectiveness should be
manipulated by the largest possible range of potential
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